STRANGE BEDFELLOWS MAKE NORMAL
POLITICS: AN ESSAY
R. SHEP MELNICK*
Are contemporary American environmental policies the product
of (a) public spirited debate about the nature of the common good or
(b) illicit deals struck by parochial, rent-seeking organized interests,
covered with a thin veneer of public interest rhetoric? This was the
question before the Third Annual Cummings Colloquium. Two
groups of people seem to adopt the latter view: political economists
and average citizens. A majority of Americans believe that the
federal government is run by a small number of organized interests
and consequently, that the government cannot be trusted to do what
1
is right most of the time. Political economists steeped in Mancur
2
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action offer an elaborate justification for
3
this vague public skepticism.
This point of view is succinctly
summarized as follows:
Modern theories of voluntary organization, derived from Mancur
Olson, imply that national environmental groups will be difficult, if
not impossible, to organize. Large numbers of citizens, each with
only a small stake in clean air, will, if they are rational in the
narrow economic sense, decline to invest their time or money in the
cause of cleaning up the environment in the hope that they will be
able to “free-ride” on the efforts of others . . . . It is a small step
from Olson’s theory of voluntary organizations to the political
corollary that the interest of citizens in a clean environment will be
systematically underrepresented in any lawmaking process in which
interest group politics plays a significant role. Individual citizens
who wish to breathe clean air are a classic example of a large,
disorganized population seeking a collective good which will
benefit each individual by only a small amount. The costs of
environmental regulation, on the other hand, tend to fall heavily on
a relatively small number of companies, which are already
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& POLICIES 99-100 (1998).
2. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
3. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization
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reasonably well-organized and thus presumably less subject to free4
rider problems.

From this perspective, the only realistic explanation for the passage
of environmental legislation is that it provides organized interests
with indirect benefits such as barriers to entry and higher costs for
competitors.
Serious students of government and politics understood the
collective action problem and its implications for regulation long
before Olson published his famous analysis. In his 1955 book,
Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Marver Bernstein
pointed out that most regulatory legislation is the product of brief
5
moments of intense political agitation. Politicians believe they must
respond to voters’ concerns about the abuses of the railroads, the
political and economic power of the trusts, the dangers of impure
food and drugs, and the survival of our ecosystem. However, as
public attention quickly wanes, so does the commitment of politicians
and the “aggressive crusading spirit” of regulatory commissions.
Gradually and inevitably:
[T]he spirit of controversy fades out of the regulatory setting, and
the commission adjusts to conflict among the parties in interest. It
relies more and more on settled procedures and adapts itself to the
need to fight its own political battles unassisted by informed public
opinion and effective national political leadership . . . . Perhaps the
most marked development in a mature commission is the growth of
a passivity that borders on apathy. There is a desire to avoid
conflicts and to enjoy good relations with the regulated groups . . . .
The close of the period of maturity is marked by the commission’s
6
surrender to the regulated.

Such “capture” of the commission by the regulated is inevitable
because dispersed, unorganized citizens cannot sustain the effort
needed to counteract the power of organized interests. Dispersed
publics may win momentary victories but cannot prevail in the long
7
run.

4. Id. at 322.
5. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 75
(1955).
6. Id. at 86-88, 90. For a description of how the surrender of the commission to the
regulated might have applied to environmental protection, see Anthony Downs, Up and Down
with Ecology—the “Issue-Attention Cycle”, 28 PUB. INTEREST, 38, 43-50 (1972).
7. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communication Commission
are two classic examples of this tendency.
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Reformers of the 1960s and 1970s were familiar with the
“capture theories” of Bernstein and others and were determined to
find ways to save new “social” regulators at the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”), the Occupational Safety & Hazard
Administration, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission from the fate of “economic” regulation at the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal
Communication Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Their efforts produced
many of the distinctive features of environmental statutes: detailed
rules, strict deadlines, citizen suits, aggressive judicial review, and
extensive opportunity for public participation. In large part, they
succeeded both in allowing environmental groups to survive and
forcing business firms to spend enormous amounts of money on
pollution control. The reformers’ success is attributable not just to
their cleverness, but to larger changes in American politics, including
the rise of subcommittee government in Congress, the
institutionalization of judicial activism, the persistence of divided
government, and the adversarial stance of the media after Vietnam
and Watergate.
These changes made it easier for political
entrepreneurs to mobilize dispersed publics and to use the threat of
mobilization to wield power in Washington. As is usually the case
with simple, abstract theories, Olson and Bernstein’s models were not
so much wrong as seriously incomplete.
A variety of studies have shown that EPA has maintained an
adversarial stance toward those it regulates, that environmental
regulation has become more extensive and stringent over time, and
that environmental groups wield significant influence in Congress,
8
EPA, and the courts. Yet, other studies have shown that organized
economic interests often join forces with environmental advocates.
The most famous and best documented example is the scrubbing
requirement of the 1977 Clean Air Act. As Bruce Ackerman and
8. See generally MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON (expanded ed. 1994); RONALD
BRICKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES (1985); DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986); JOHN M.
MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION: HOW OVERREGULATION
CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA (1988); RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS,
THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE (1989); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); DANIEL J. FIORINO, MAKING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1995); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
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William Hassler demonstrate, environmentalists allied themselves
with eastern dirty coal producers and miners to impose regulations
that were both economically and environmentally inferior to obvious
9
alternatives. Shorter studies of the 1977 Clean Air Act’s Prevention
of Significant Deterioration program (PSD) have shown that some of
the support for PSD was protectionist: polluted urban districts
10
wanted to make it more difficult for firms to move to cleaner areas.
Ethanol and methanol producers joined environmentalists in fighting
11
for a “clean fuels” provision in the 1990 Clean Air Act. American
producers of CFCs endorsed the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer once they realized they could reap
12
windfall profits from the agreement.
These studies demonstrate (a) that some firms will receive a
competitive boost from environmental regulation, (b) that in a few
instances these firms actively promote such rent-producing policies,
and (c) that in an even smaller number of cases they actually get what
they want. But these studies do not demonstrate either that
successful rent-seeking is common or that rent-seekers can prevail
without assistance from environmental groups or other broad-based
constituencies. Ackerman and Hassler argue that eastern coal
interests could not have won in Congress or the EPA without the
support of environmentalists, who sought both to curry favor with
13
labor and to limit development in the west. B. Peter Pashigian notes
that some westerners in Congress voted for strong PSD provisions
even though it would curtail economic development in their
14
districts.
It is highly unlikely that Congress would ever have
considered PSD if the Sierra Club had not won a remarkable court

9. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 117-18
(1981).
10. See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being
Protected? 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551, 558 (1985); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REV. 431, 467 (1989). It bears noting that McNollGast’s principal claim on PSD—that
economic protectionism led the House to pass a stronger PSD provision than the Senate—is
seriously flawed. See Craig Oren, Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-Noll-Weingast Hypothesis and
the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 45, 61-76 (1989).
11. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19, 26 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS].
12. See Daniel F. McInnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS, supra note 11, at 129, 142.
13. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 9, at 31-38.
14. See Pashigian, supra note 10 .
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15

victory several years before. McInnis points out that American CFC
producers were slow to jump on the Montreal Protocol bandwagon,
16
and that Congress eventually taxed away their windfall profits. In
short, attributing the bulk of environmental regulation to rentseeking by organized economic interests requires us to make
untenable assumptions about the political clout and cleverness of
business leaders.
Most of the regulations mentioned above—scrubbing, PSD,
clean fuels, ozone protection—were produced by what Bruce Yandle
has aptly called an alliance of “Baptists and bootleggers.” Yandle
argues that most coalitions supporting government regulation
“include[] some that seek directly enhanced wealth and others that
17
wish for an improved vision of society.” Baptists support Sunday
closing laws to promote both moral behavior and church attendance.
Bootleggers support these restrictions in order to shut down their
18
competitors one day a week. If Baptists succeed in banning legal
drinking completely, then the bootleggers will be able to put their
legal competitors out of business entirely. Note, though, that the
bootleggers are usually the junior partners in this coalition. They did
not initiate the policy, nor can they sustain it for long after the
political power of the Baptists fades. Showing that a group
eventually benefited from regulation in no way demonstrates that it is
responsible for enactment or maintenance of the regulatory regime.
Putting together coalitions broad enough to enact major
environmental legislation in the United States requires a wide array
of compatible interests, considerable political skill, and more than a
modicum of luck. For coalition builders, failure is far more common
than success. Amendments to the Clean Air Act were considered in
nearly every Congress during the 1980s but did not complete the
“obstacle course on Capitol Hill” until 1990. It is doubtful that any
simple, abstract model can either predict or explain the politics
behind such massive, complex, detailed legislative products. The best
we can do is become familiar with the key players—both Baptists and
bootleggers—and think about how their interests might at times
converge.

15. See MELNICK, supra note 8, at 96.
16. See McInnis, supra note 12, at 150.
17. THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: TRACKING THE UNICORN
23 (1989).
18. See id. at 24.
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BAPTISTS
One reason the Baptist/bootlegger metaphor is so useful for
describing environmental regulation is because environmentalism has
become a formidable secular religion in contemporary America.
Support for environmentalism is widespread with deep cultural roots.
The diverse sentiments and beliefs we associate with
environmentalism tap into the public’s desire for health and security,
for recreation and beauty, for a morally pure political cause, and for a
simpler, more tranquil life.
Support for environmentalism is
reinforced by fears of change and dislocation, distrust of large
corporations, and dread of cancer and invisible pathogens. As those
with school-aged children know, teachers and television repeatedly
deliver sermons on our sacred duty to protect the earth.
Environmentalism has its own clergy, rival denominations, crusades,
revivals, catechisms, heresies, and schisms.
Some scholars argue that the U.S. has experienced a “paradigm
shift” from the material values of an industrial era to the “post19
material values” of our “post-industrial age.” Whether or not this is
true, polling data clearly show strong and consistent public support
for environmental programs. For years large majorities of those
polled agree with the statement that “[p]rotecting the environment is
so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high,
and continuing environmental improvement must be made regardless
20
of cost.” In fact by 1989, about 70% agreed and fewer than 20%
21
disagreed. In 1990-91, about 60% of the public believed there was
“too little” environmental regulation and only 15% thought there
22
was “too much.” Even in 1994, the year the Republicans gained
control of Congress, almost half those polled thought that current
laws “don’t go far enough in protecting the environment,” and less
23
than one-fifth stated these laws “have gone too far.” In early 1996,

19. See generally RONALD INGLEHART, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: CHANGING VALUES AND
POLITICAL STYLES AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS (1977); Samuel Hayes, Three Decades of
Environmental Politics: The Historical Context, in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR II 19 (Michael Lacey
ed., 1989).
20. Robert Cameron Mitchell, Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 81, 85 (Norman Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
21. See id.
22. See Bob Benenson, GOP Sets the 104th Congress on New Regulatory Course, 53 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP., 1693, 1696-97 (1995).
23. Opinion Pulse: Environmental Protection, AM. ENTERPRISE, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 100, 108.
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Republican pollsters warned that congressional attacks on
24
environmental programs were seriously wounding the GOP.
The key question is how this broad support for environmental
programs is converted into political influence, congressional action,
and aggressive enforcement? That, of course, is Mancur Olson’s
challenge to us.
Part of the answer lies in the remarkable success of
contemporary environmental groups. In 1970, one might well have
questioned whether politically active environmental groups would
survive the ephemeral enthusiasm of the first Earth Day. To be sure,
many environmental groups did disappear. But several of the
organizations founded in the late 1960s and early 1970s have
25
prospered.
Just as importantly, traditional conservation and
recreation-oriented groups such as the Sierra Club, the National
Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Izaak
Walton League increased their political activity and provided
environmentalism with a large, middle class membership base.
National environmental groups have proven remarkably adept at
using the media, winning court suits, building broad legislative
coalitions, and supplying Democratic administrations with forceful
political executives.
Students of voluntary organizations have long puzzled over the
success of these Olson-defying organizations. To be sure, some build
membership roles through “selective incentives”: calendars,
recreation guides, and group discounts. Advocacy groups such as the
National Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) and the
Environmental Defense Fund initially relied on grants from deeppocketed patrons at the Carnegie, Field, Rockefeller Brothers, and
26
Ford Foundations. As these funds diminished some groups relied

24. See generally Ben Wildavsky, Carrying On, 28 NATIONAL JOURNAL 991 (1996).
25. See infra Appendix A at 93.
26. See Michael S. Greve & James Keller, Funding the Left: The Sources of Financial Support
for ‘Public Interest’ Law Firms, in CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES: WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 10
(Washington Legal Foundation ed., 1987). Greve and Keller report that foundation giving
accounts for about one third of the budget of these public interest law firms. See also JACK L.
WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 41-55 (1991) (explaining the importance of such patrons for overcoming the
free-rider problem).
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27

more on attorneys fees collected under environmental statutes.
28
They used fees collected in one case to subsidize work on the next.
In the long run, though, maintenance of these organizations rests
29
on what James Q. Wilson calls “purposive incentives.” Members
are asked to make small contributions in order to save the earth, the
rainforest, the ozone layer, the Alaskan wilderness, or to stop such
enemies of ecological wellbeing as James Watt, Anne Gorsuch, or
Newt Gingrich. As irrational as such contributions seem to some
economists (who, no doubt, make such contributions themselves),
they have kept many environmental groups solvent for years. Just as
importantly, purposive incentives help these groups maintain a high
level of commitment among their talented, barely-paid staff. Asked
how environmentalists could compete with highly paid industry
lobbyists, a Sierra Club staffer replied, “[t]he bottom line is they’re
30
mercenaries and we’re true believers.” Those familiar with the role
that David Hawkins, Richard Ayres, David Doninger, and others
have played in shaping the Clean Air Act can readily understand the
importance of this level and length of commitment.
The fact that environmental groups do not rely on material
incentives does not make them altruistic or guarantee that they will
speak for the public as a whole. They may not be rent-seeking, but
they certainly are power-seeking. Their ambition is not just to
remake public policy, but to remake the American public itself. At
times they are guilty of dangerous zealotry and demagoguery.
Indeed, reliance on purposive incentives virtually guarantees that
they will propagate an apocalyptic, moralistic message and demonize
their opponents. Whatever their vices, leaders of environmental
groups are seldom guilty of conventional greed. For better or worse,
they generally place prophecy over profits.
In the long run, the success of environmental groups in Congress
and the administrative process rested on their ability to mobilize—or
threaten to mobilize—“inattentive publics,” i.e. the millions of voters
who support environmental protection but pay little attention to
activities of the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards or the

27. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen
Suits became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 11, at 105, 10710.
28. See id.
29. See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 34-36 (1973).
30. See George Hager, LOBBYISTS: For Industry and Opponents, A Showdown Is in the
Air, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 145, 147 (1990).
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31

House Commerce Committee.
As Arnold explains, “legislators
ignore inattentive publics at their peril. Latent or unfocused opinions
can quickly be transformed into intense and very real opinions with
32
enormous political repercussions.”
Transforming inattentive publics into angry voters requires an
33
“instigator who can communicate with relevant publics . . . .”
Although candidates challenging incumbents can sometimes play this
role, it helps to stand somewhat above the electoral fray. Arnold
points to Ralph Nader as a particularly skilled instigator who became
a model for contemporary reformers:
[b]efore Nader, legislators could ignore the consumers’ point of
view, confident that no one would ever be able to rally the
unorganized masses against them. Nader’s contribution was not to
organize consumers—a nearly impossible task—but rather to label
legislative votes as pro- or anticonsumer. The media then
disseminated these messages, challengers helped citizens reach the
proper political conclusions, and suddenly a formerly inattentive
public was alive. Once Nader had demonstrated his ability to
mobilize an otherwise inattentive public several times, he no longer
had to do so regularly; simply labeling legislative votes as
anticonsumer provided ammunition that others could use, and the
mere existence of this ammunition was threatening enough to some
34
legislators.

Environmental groups adopted Nader’s strategy. “Here one of the
finest tactical maneuvers was to label legislators who had the worst
environmental records as ‘The Dirty Dozen,’ in order to generate
media attention and make it easier for inattentive citizens to identify
35
the obstacles to clean water and fresh air.” As one House staffer
explained, “members are deathly afraid of being labeled anti36
environment.”
Another noted that environmental groups “can
37
dump 5,000 or 10,000 signatures on you in pretty short order.”
Mobilizing “inattentive publics” is easiest when instigators can
credibly promise widely distributed benefits while claiming that
31. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 68-71 (1990).
32. Id. at 68. Arnold’s discussion of “inattentive publics” is consistent with and in part based
upon James Q. Wilson’s analysis of “entrepreneurial politics.” See generally WILSON, supra note
29, at chs. 15 - 16; WILSON & DIIULIO, supra note 1, at chs. 15, 22. The following paragraphs rely
heavily on Wilson’s discussion of political entrepreneurship.
33. ARNOLD, supra note 31, at 68.
34. Id. at 69.
35. Id.
36. Hager, supra note 30, at 145.
37. Id.
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outsiders or malefactors of great wealth will bear most of the costs.
For example, environmental advocates argued that millions of
Americans would benefit from elimination of smog and the auto
industry (which had caused the problem in the first place) would foot
the bill. Similarly, chemical companies and “midnight dumpers”
would pay the cost of cleaning up toxic waste sites and reducing
emission of “hazardous pollutants.” For years politicians in New
York and New England pushed measures that would reduce acid rain
in their states by imposing costly controls on Midwestern utilities.
The strategy of “cost-externalization” is a key component of
38
entrepreneurial politics.
Colloquium participants who have worked for environmental
groups noted that environmentalists’ political clout is based in large
part on their ability to generate publicity. As NRDC’s Greg
Wetstone put it, “[w]hen the media pays attention, we win. When the
issues are highly technical or are resolved in the backroom, we
39
lose.” While most Americans prefer “government in the sunshine”
to “backroom politics,” generating the requisite publicity often
involves oversimplifying complex issues, exaggerating environmental
risks, hiding control costs, and playing on public fears.
The success of environmentalists and consumer advocates in
playing the instigator role reflects not just the political skills of their
leaders, but the new opportunities created by important changes in
40
our political system since the mid-1960s.
For example,
environmentalists found reliable allies among a new breed of
investigative reporters looking for dramatic stories with “good
visuals” and for evidence of misdeeds by industry and government.
Environmentalism is clearly a cause with which most contemporary
journalists can identify. Asked to identify sources to which they
would turn to get reliable information on environmental issues, 69%
of the journalists named environmental activists, 68% listed federal
41
environmental agencies, and a mere 27% said business. As William
Ruchelshaus has put it, “environmental reporters are often as close to

38. See Elliott et al., supra note 3, at 329-30.
39. Greg Wetstone, Remarks at the Third Annual Cummings Colloquium - The Rents of
Nature: Special Interests and the Puzzle of Environmental Legislation (Mar. 27 , 1998).
40. For an explanation of these broad changes, see generally THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC
POLICY (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995); THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
(Anthony Kind ed., 2d. ver. 1990); REMAKING AMERICAN POLITICS (Richard A. Harris & Sidney
M. Milkis eds., 1989).
41. See S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., THE MEDIA ELITE 57 (1986).
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the environmental movement as the members of the movement
42
itself.”
Environmental groups were particularly fortunate to appear on
the scene just as “subcommittee government” was taking hold in
Congress and the “new administrative law” was establishing itself in
43
the federal courts. Environmentalists found valuable allies in such
places as the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, the
House Commerce Committee’s subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, the D.C. Circuit (before Reagan appointees took
over), and the Ninth Circuit. Senators Edmund Muskie, Robert
Stafford, and John Chafee, Representatives Paul Rogers, James
Florio, and Henry Waxman, Judges Skelly Wright, David Bazelon,
and Abna Mikva, and many other strategically positioned officials
worked assiduously to build more effective soapboxes for reaching
“inattentive publics.” Although environmentalists contributed to
both sets of institutional change, for the most part they rode a much
larger historical wave.
From the dawn of “subcommittee government” in the early
1970s to the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, self-selection
in committee assignments produced committees, subcommittees, and
staff dedicated to the cause of environmental protection. Members
asked to sit on these panels because they considered environmental
protection to be a particularly noble and popular cause. Veteran
subcommittee leaders tended to view the Clean Air Act, Superfund,
the Toxic Substances Control Act, and other enactments as their
laws, and were not shy about explaining to administrators what they
meant. Committees held regular oversight hearings, hired staff to
monitor agency activity, and created elaborate reporting mechanisms
in federal statutes. During the 1970s and 1980s, EPA officials
appeared before congressional committees between 50 and 100 times
44
per year. EPA Administrator Russell Train recalled that Muskie’s

42. WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ORAL
HISTORY INTERVIEW-1 35 (1993).
43. On Congress, see generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF
CONGRESS (1981); CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS
(3d. ed. 1997). On administrative law, see generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS
THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
44. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 211-13.
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staff “didn’t let many days go by without calling and telling you what
45
you did wrong.”
Changes in the American party system also enhanced the
political appeal of environmentalism. The rapid collapse of party
organizations after 1960 turned nominations into free-for-alls among
46
self-appointed candidates.
Many candidates sought to identify
themselves with a popular cause and to align themselves with groups
possessing extensive membership lists. Especially in Democratic
primaries, it helps to be known as the “green” candidate. This is
probably most true in low-visibility congressional primaries. But
even in presidential primaries we have many examples of candidates
who tout their environmental credentials: Edmund Muskie in 1972,
Morris Udall in 1976, Gary Hart in 1984, Al Gore in 1988 and 2000.
In an era of “candidate-centered elections,” what better way is there
to demonstrate that one will fight for the public good, stand up to
special interests, look to the future, and appeal to affluent, goodgovernment suburban voters?
Another key feature of contemporary American politics is the
persistence of divided government. Since 1969 we have had but six
47
years of united government. With neither party able to command
the support of a majority of voters, each is constantly looking for an
issue that can cement the next realignment. Conversely, each wants
to deprive the other of any potentially realigning issue. Each must
bear some responsibility for the fate of important legislation; each
covets the opportunity to blame the other party for defeating
proposals with broad popular appeal.
Democrats have seen
environmentalism as an issue that can return to their party some of
the lost elements of the New Deal coalition. Republicans have often
realized that their ties with business and their skepticism about
government intervention can become liabilities when the public
focuses on environmental issues. Congressional Democrats learned
stringent environmental laws can serve as convenient sticks for
beating Republican Administrations - the more unrealistic the
deadline, the surer the opportunity for inquisitorial oversight
hearings. Party competition in an age of weak party organization and
divided government thus created a dynamic that has kept

45. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ORAL HISTORY
INTERVIEW-1 12 (1993).
46. See generally MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS:
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980S ch. 7 (1991).
47. Those years were from 1976 to 1980 and from 1992 to 1994.
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environmental issues in the public arena and produced rigid,
demanding environmental statutes.
The clearest instance of partisan bidding on environmental
protection is the 1970 Clean Air Act. Edmund Muskie, the
frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination, personified
the congressional challenge to the Nixon White House. By virtue of
his chairmanship of the Public Works Committee’s subcommittee on
air and water pollution, Muskie staked out his claim on the topic
before it became politically fashionable. Hoping to preempt Muskie,
President Nixon proposed legislation with legally binding national air
quality standards. Stung by criticism from public interest groups and
in danger of being upstaged by Nixon, Muskie and his staff wrote a
particularly demanding law, including a mandate for 90% emission
reduction from new cars and a 1975 deadline for meeting ambient air
quality standards. Although President Nixon signed the Clean Air
Act, his administration pressured EPA to go slow in implementing
48
it. This led to congressional hearings attacking the administration
for failing to comply with the “intent” of Congress, as well as a
blizzard of law suits, many of which were won by environmental
49
groups.
A strikingly similar pattern appeared twenty years later. During
the 1988 campaign, George Bush proclaimed that he wanted to be the
“Environmental President” and pledged to support strong air
pollution legislation.
The Bush Administration subsequently
proposed an innovative acid rain program. Democrats in Congress
strengthened the Bush proposal and added a wide variety of other
mandates. The White House threatened to veto the resulting 31450
page omnibus bill, but eventually backed down.
House
subcommittee chair Henry Waxman noted that:
[t]he specificity in the 1990 Amendments reflects the concern that,
without detailed directives, industry intervention might frustrate
efforts to put pollution control steps in place . . . . History shows
that even where EPA seeks to take strong action, the White House
51
will often intervene at industry’s behest to block regulatory action.

48. See MELNICK, supra note 8, at 31-35, 126-29, 373-79.
49. See id.
50. See generally Marc K. Landy, The New Politics of Environmental Policy, in THE NEW
POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 40, at 218, 218-21; GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES,
GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 114-35 (1995).
51. Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L.
1721, 1743-44 (1991).
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Before long, Waxman’s subcommittee was holding well publicized
hearings claiming that the Bush Administration’s Competitiveness
52
Council had ordered EPA to ignore provisions of the new law.
No discussion of the success of environmentalism would be
complete without mention of another set of actors who play a crucial
role in legislative politics: public agencies dedicated to implementing
environmental programs. These government bureaucracies not only
enforce existing regulations, but identify new problems, propose
incremental expansions, and build public support for their cause.
EPA played a central role in creating Superfund, launching a war on
cancer-causing pollutants, establishing a complex “nonattainment”
policy under the 1970 Clean Air Act, and writing the much-criticized
national permit section, i.e. Title V, of the 1990 Clean Air Act—to
mention only a few examples. The federal EPA is joined by 50 state
agencies, the Association of State and Territorial Air Pollution
Program Administrators, and the Association of Local Air Pollution
Control Officers, not to mention the federal Fish and Wildlife
Service, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, and other
federal agencies whose bureaucratic missions and professional norms
lead them to promote environmental programs. To deny that these
large organizations with impressive expertise play an important,
independent role in policymaking—as economic theories of
regulation almost always do—flies in the face of years of experience.
BOOTLEGGERS
By emphasizing the ways in which environmental groups,
politicians, and administrators can give political force to dispersed
public support for environmental protection, I do not mean to imply
that business firms, trade associations, and unions are not important
elements of the coalitions supporting particular policies. Initially
most firms and trade associations are wary of increased government
regulation. But once a regulatory regime is in place, many businesses
develop a stake in their continuation. A few discover they can
improve their competitive position through expansion of regulatory
controls. The literature on environmental policy includes a number
of case studies documenting firms’ efforts to use regulation to their
53
advantage.
52. See Robert J. Duffy, Divided Government and Institutional Combat: The Case of the
Quayle Council on Competitiveness, 28 POLITY 379, 390-94 (Spring 1996).
53. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 5; LANDY, supra note 8; see also Marc K. Landy & Mary
Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private Interests and Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS,
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In his insightful book, Who Profits: Winners, Losers, and
Government Regulation, Robert Leone emphasizes that “every act of
government, no matter what its broader merits or demerits for
society at large, creates winners and losers within the competitive
54
sector of the economy.” As Leone explains:
[s]ince the price effects of regulation are essentially the same for all
producers, but cost effects differ, public actions necessarily affect
firms differently. All firms with cost increases less than the price
increase actually see their profits increase with government
intervention. Those firms with cost increases above the level of
55
sustainable price increases experience losses.

Losers are likely to push for regulatory relief. Winners are likely to
oppose these demands for relaxation, quietly acquiesce to further
regulation, and even join forces with environmental advocates to
extend regulatory requirements. Of course, the extent to which firms
have adequate information on their compliance costs and the
compliance costs of their competitors is open to question. Who wins
and who loses usually is apparent only after the regulatory regime has
been in place for some time.
What sort of political divisions are created by a regulatory
regime? Leone’s work and the case studies cited above suggest that
the following distinctions are politically important:
• Some firms invest in equipment and personnel to comply
with government rules. Others drag their heels as long as
possible and engage in protracted battles with enforcers.
“Good apples” have an interest in stricter enforcement
against “bad apples.”
• Similarly, firms that have already invested in compliance will
not relish seeing new entrants freed from these rules. Unless
they expect to expand significantly, they are likely to oppose
suspension of existing rules and to favor more stringent rules
for new sources than for existing sources.
• Large firms may be better at dealing with government
paperwork than small firms, either because of their
bureaucratic corporate culture or because there are
economies of scale in dealing with red tape. Conversely,
supra note 11, at 67; David Vogel, Trouble for Us and Trouble for Them: Social Regulation as
Trade Barriers, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE? SOCIAL REGULATION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 98, 98-145 (Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997).
54. ROBERT A. LEONE, WHO PROFITS: WINNERS, LOSERS AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION 3 (1986).
55. Id. at 44.
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small business may be more successful at gaining delay,
exemptions, and reprieves from Congress and other
legislative bodies.
• Firms operating in many states may prefer uniform national
rules to 50 sets of state laws. Smaller firms may prefer to
take their chances with the states.
• Some forms of regulation apply to domestic producers but
not their foreign competitors.
Others are consciously
designed to make compliance by domestic producers less
56
costly or to fence out foreign producers.
• Regulations that ban consumer products or inputs or that
make them more costly increase demand for alternatives.
Producers of these alternatives will thus have an incentive to
support government restrictions. Sometimes producers of
the regulated good will also be producers of the alternative,
as was apparently the case with CFCs and reformulated
gasoline.
These winners and losers have a variety of political strategies
from which to choose. Some of these strategies seek to minimize
government regulation, others to expand it. Some promote quick and
easy alliances with environmental advocates, other produce more
troubled marriages.
Among the strategies described in the
environmental literature are the following:
• Promote the least objectionable alternative. Once the
regulatory handwriting is on the wall, regulated firms will try
to figure out which of the possible regulatory alternatives is
least costly and intrusive. Their championing of a particular
alternative does not mean that they will benefit from
regulation, but only that they have resigned themselves to it.
Thus in 1970 the auto makers preferred a two-car strategy to
a 50-car strategy. In 1887 the railroads preferred a slow,
court-like regulatory commission to a more energetic
executive agency. In 1990 chemical companies apparently
preferred a technology based “maximum achievable control
technology” to more restrictive exposure limits.
• Regulate your competitor. Why should the other guy be
subject to less regulation than I? If every regulation
produces a competitive advantage for some firms or
industries, then they will also create political demands for
56. See Vogel, supra note 53, at 108-10.
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“leveling the playing field.”
This was essentially the
argument of eastern coal interests: environmental rules give
an unfair boost to western coal.
Similarly, stringent
regulations in urban areas give an “unfair” advantage to
rural areas. In general, regulations that require costly
retrofitting of existing facilities generate demands for even
stricter rules on new facilities. When the argument is framed
in terms of imposing tighter controls on competitors rather
than relaxing controls on those currently subject to
regulation, environmental advocates will frequently join the
effort—if they have not already given the bandwagon its
initial push.
• Define and manipulate emerging markets. Environmental
regulations increase demands for cleaner inputs and
consumer goods. Producers will have an intense interest in
57
seeing their products permitted and encouraged.
• Raise barriers to entry. Higher capital costs, stringent rules
on new sources, elaborate and time-consuming paperwork
requirements—all these (and much more) make it more
difficult for new firms to enter a market. But raising barriers
to entry without increasing the costs of existing firms is not
always easy - nor is it an attractive strategy for firms that
expect to expand in the near future.
Of course, a regulatory restriction that improves one’s competitive
position might also substantially reduce the autonomy of managers.
Given the uncertainty over the former, the latter may loom
particularly large.
Although competition among firms creates incentives for the
strategic use of regulation, it also makes political cooperation among
58
firms difficult. Trade associations and peak associations often fail to
reach internal agreement on controversial issues. They frequently
face severe collective action problems. As James Madison predicted,
multiplying the number of interests affected by regulation tends to
59
reduce the political power of those interests. “Business” may be

57. The best example is the dispute over clean fuels, described in Adler, supra note 11, at 2438. It should be noted that both ethanol and methanol producers had difficulty prevailing in
Congress and the administrative process. Their interests were too transparent, and the public
benefit of the rules too dubious to generate a stable governing coalition.
58. A peak association is one that claims to represent business or labor generally such as
the AFL-CIO.
59. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (James Madison) (Bicentennial ed., 1976).
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organized, but it is seldom united. Far from omnipotent, “the
business community” is close to an oxymoron.
Ironically, those scholars most intent on claiming that policy is
the result of lobbying by organized groups spend very little time
actually observing the political behavior of organized groups. To
understand the role of organized economic interests in the formation
of environmental policy we need less abstract model-building and
more painstaking empirical research on the political strategies of
business. Students of environmental politics need to do what
Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Dexter did in the late
60
61
1950s and early 1960s and David Vogel has done in recent years:
interview lobbyists; pour over documents and newspapers; follow the
long, winding road of legislation and administrative rules; be alert to
the uncertainties of economic and political life as well as the potential
for unlikely alliances. Such research often requires what Richard
Fenno has described as “soaking and poking—or just hanging
62
around.” It cannot be done in one’s office, nor will it produce
elegant, parsimonious models.
But to paraphrase a famous
economist and remarkable public servant, it is better to be
63
“approximately right” than “precisely wrong.”

60. See generally RAYMOND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (2d. ed. 1972).
61. See generally DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF
BUSINESS IN AMERICA (1989).
62. HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 249 (1978).
63. Alfred Kahn, quoted in THOMAS K. MCGRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 247 (1984).
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APPENDIX A64
National Audubon Society (founded 1905)
Members:
516,220 (1980: 412,000)
Budget:
$32.9 million
Staff:
337
Defenders of Wildlife (founded 1947)
Members:
80,000 (1980: 44,000)
Budget:
$4.5 million
Staff:
30
Environmental Action (founded 1970)
Members:
20,000
Budget:
$1.2 million
Staff:
24
Environmental Defense Fund (founded 1967)
Members:
125,000 (1980: 45,000)
Budget:
$12.9 million
Staff:
100
Friends of the Earth (founded 1969)
Members:
50,000
Budget:
$2.5 million
Staff:
35
Greenpeace (founded 1971)
Members:
Budget:
Staff:

64. See Hager, supra note 30, at 146.

1.4 million
$33.9 million
1,200
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Izaak Walton League of America (founded 1922)
Members:
50,000
Budget:
$1.8 million
Staff:
26
League of Conservation Voters (founded 1970)
Members:
15,000
Budget:
$500,000
Staff:
40
National Parks and Conservation Association (founded 1919)
Members:
100,000
Budget:
$3.8 million
Staff:
30
National Wildlife Federation (founded 1936)
Members:
5.6 million members and supporters
Budget:
$85 million
Staff:
700
National Resource Defense Council (founded 1970)
Members:
125,000 (1980: 42,000)
Budget:
$13 million
Staff:
125 (40 lawyers)
Sierra Club (founded 1892)
Members:
Budget:
Staff:

553,246 (1980: 180,000)
$28 million
185

The Wilderness Society (founded 1935)
Members:
330,000 (1980: 45,000)
Budget:
$20 million
Staff:
130

